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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MOMENT OF SILENCE STAT-
UTES MAY THREATEN THE WALL OF SEPARATION BE-
TWEEN CHURCH AND STATE-Wallace v. Jafree.
INMODUCTION
The wall separating church and state is built from the bricks
and mortar of the first amendment's establishment clause, which
provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion. . . ."I For twenty-three years, the United States
Supreme Court has rigidly maintained the wall's impregnability in-
sofar as it applies to prayer and the public schools. In Engel v.
Vitale2 and Abington School District v. Schempp, the Court held
oral Bible reading and mandatory prayer in public schools to be
unconstitutional. In Stone v. Graham,4 printed copies of the Ten
Commandments posted on public school classroom walls fell under
the same edict. In Treen v. Karen B.,5 the Court struck down a
statute permitting voluntary vocal prayer in public schools. Many
states responded by enacting legislation permitting or requiring
public school teachers to have students observe a moment of si-
lence for meditation or prayer. Do these statutes threaten the wall
of separation? Some may.
One such statute from Alabama came before the United States
Supreme Court in Wallace v. Jaffree.7 The decision rested on testi-
1. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I, cl 1. The first amendment is applicable to the states
by virtue of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303 (1940). "The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures
of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact [laws respecting an establish-
ment of religion]."
2. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
3. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
4. 449 U.S. 39 (1980), reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1104 (1981).
5. 455 U.S. 913 (1982), aff'g mem., 653 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1981).
6. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1050 (1982); IND. CODE § 20-10.1-7-11
(Supp. 1985); M. REV. STAT. ANN., Tit. 20-A, § 4805 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §
49-6-1004 (1983).
7. 105 S. Ct. 2497 (1985).
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mony of the statute's sponsor and a statement of intent in the leg-
islative record, both of which indicated that the legislation was an
effort to return voluntary prayer to the public schools. 8 Based
upon this evidence, the plurality found that the statute's enact-
ment was not motivated by any clearly secular purpose; rather, its
enactment was motivated by a purpose to endorse religion.' As
such, the statute was a law respecting the establishment of religion
and violated the first amendment."0 In dicta, however, the Court
suggested that not all statutes with similar wording would necessa-
rily be unconstitutional, even if they were "motivated in part by a
religious purpose.""
The three dissenting Justices each wrote separately. 2 Chief
Justice Burger disagreed with the Court's reliance on postenact-
ment testimony.1" Justice White did not interpret the establish-
ment clause to proscribe a statute from providing for a moment of
silence for meditation or prayer.1 Justice Rehnquist attacked the
Court's constitutional doctrine, which he considered to be built
upon a mistaken understanding of Jefferson's "misleading
metaphor."1 5
This Note will trace the Supreme Court's treatment of prayer
in the public schools. It will then explore the parameters laid out
in Jaffree and demonstrate that the Supreme Court has relaxed its
rigid attitude towards prayer in the public schools. Finally, the
Note will apply the Jafiree parameters to North Carolina's new
"Moment of Silence" statute.18
8. Id. at 2490. Senator Holmes inserted the following statement into the leg-
islative record: "Gentlemen, by passage of this bill by the Alabama Legislature
our children in this state will have the opportunity of sharing in the spiritual
heritage of this state and this country. The United States as well as the State of
Alabama was founded by people who believe in God. I believe this effort to return
voluntary prayer to our public schools for its return to us to the original position
[sic] of the writers of the Constitution, this local philosophies and beliefs hun-
dreds of Alabamians [sic] have urged my continuous support for permitting
school prayer. Since coming to the Alabama Senate I have worked hard on this
legislation to accomplish the return of voluntary prayer in our public schools and
return to the basic moral fiber.[sic]" Id. n.43.
9. Id. at 2492.
10. Id. at 2493.
11. Id. at 2490.
12. Burger, C.J., White and Rehnquist, JJ.
13. 105 S. Ct. at 2506.
14. Id. at 2508.
15. Id. at 2509.
16. 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 637. To be codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-
126 [Vol. 8:125
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THE CASE
In 1978, Alabama enacted a statute authorizing a one minute
period of silence "for meditation" in all public schools. 17 This stat-
ute was followed by a second in 1981, which authorized a period of
silence "for meditation or voluntary prayer, ' and by a third in
1982, which authorized teachers to lead "willing students" in a pre-
scribed prayer.""
In 1978, Ishmael Jaffree, a resident of Mobile County, Ala-
bama, had three children attending public school, two in the sec-
ond grade and one in kindergarten.20 In that year he filed a com-
plaint in District Court on behalf of his children, seeking a
declaratory judgment and an injunction restraining the Mobile
County School Board, various school officials and the children's
teachers from maintaining regular prayer services or other religious
observances in the Mobile County Public Schools in violation of
the establishment clause of the first amendment.21 Mr. Jaffree al-
leged that two of the children had been subjected to religious in-
doctrination, that their teachers led the classes in saying prayers in
unison each day and that his children suffered peer ostracism if
47(28) (1985).
17. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20 (Supp. 1985). "At the commencement of the first
class each day in the first through the sixth grades in all public schools, the
teacher in charge of the room in which each such class is held shall announce that
a period of silence, not to exceed one minute in duration, shall be observed for
meditation, and during any such period silence shall be maintained and no activi-
ties engaged in."
18. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1985) (emphasis supplied). "At the com-
mencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all public schools, the
teacher in charge of the room in which each such class is held may announce that
a period of silence, not to exceed one minute in duration, shall be observed for
meditation or voluntary prayer, and during any such period no other activities
shall be engaged in."
19. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.2 (Supp. 1985). "From henceforth, any teacher or
professor in any public educational institution within the State of Alabama, rec-
ognizing that the Lord God is one, at the beginning of any homeroom or any class,
may pray, may lead willing students in prayer, or may lead the willing students in
the following prayer to God:
"Almighty God, You alone are our God. We acknowledge You as the
Creator and Supreme Judge of the World. May Your justice, Your truth,
and Your peace abound this day in the hearts of our countrymen, in the
counsels of our government, in the sanctity of our homes and in the
classrooms of our schools in the name of our Lord. Amen."
20. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2482. Mr. Jaffree is an attorney.
21. Id.
1985]
3
Spalding: Constitutional Law - Moment of Silence Statutes May Threaten the
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1985
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
they did not participate.22 In a second amended complaint in 1982,
he challenged the constitutionality of all three statutes.23
At an evidentiary hearing, the prime sponsor of the statute au-
thorizing "meditation or voluntary prayer" testified that the stat-
ute was an effort to return voluntary prayer to the public schools.24
He further stated that he had "no other purpose in mind."25 The
district court found that Jaffree was likely to prevail on the merits
because the enactment of both the "meditation or voluntary
prayer" statute and the prescribed "prayer" statute did not reflect
a clearly secular purpose. The court entered a preliminary injunc-
tion. At the trial, the district court held the "meditation" statute
to be constitutional. In addition, the court upheld the constitution-
ality of the "meditation or voluntary prayer" statute and the pre-
scribed "prayer" statute even though it found that they "en-
courage[d] a religious activity." In a temerarious opinion, the court
explored the history surrounding the framing of the Constitution
at length and concluded that the United States Supreme Court
had erred in its reading of that history. The court held that the
establishment clause did not prohibit the state from establishing a
religion.2 6 The court dismissed the case and Jaffree appealed.27
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and
22. Id. at 2483.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners, 554 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala.
1983). The court concluded that it could find: "precious little historical support"
for the view that the states were prohibited by the establishment clause of the
first amendment from establishing a religion.
More than any other provision of the Constitution, the interpreta-
tion by the United States Supreme Court of the establishment clause has
been steeped in history. This Court's independent review of the relevant
historical documents and its reading of the scholarly analysis convinces it
that the United States Supreme Court has erred in its reading of history.
Perhaps this opinion will be no more than a voice crying in the wilder-
ness and this attempt to right that which this Court is persuaded is a
misreading of history will come to nothing more than blowing in the hur-
ricane, but . . .this Court is persuaded as was Hamilton that "[e]very
breach of the fundamental laws, though dictated by necessity impairs the
sacred reverence which ought to be maintained in the breast of the rulers
towards the constitution." R. Berger, (quoting Federalist No. 25 at 158).
Id. at 1128.
27. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983).
[Vol. 8:125
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reversed in part.2 The court held the "meditation" statute to be
constitutional. In contrast, it held that the statute containing the
prescribed prayer and the statute authorizing a period of silence
for "meditation or voluntary prayer" were unconstitutional be-
cause they advanced and encouraged religious activities.2 9 Even
though the statutes were permissive in form, they were neverthe-
less laws respecting an establishment of religion.3" A petition for
rehearing was denied over the dissent of four judges, who ex-
pressed doubt that the "meditation or voluntary prayer" statute
was unconstitutional. 1 The State of Alabama appealed the deci-
sion on the "prayer" and the "meditation or voluntary prayer"
statutes.
32
The United States Supreme Court reviewed the two statutes
separately.33 The Court unanimously affirmed the court of appeals'
judgment on the prescribed "prayer" statute." In considering the
"meditation or voluntary prayer" statute, the Supreme Court
found that the enactment of the statute was not motivated by any
clearly secular purpose. 35 To be constitutional, every statute ex-
amined under the establishment clause must have a secular legisla-
tive purpose.36 The addition of the words "or voluntary prayer"
indicated that the state impermissibly intended to convey a mes-
sage of endorsement of prayer as a favored practice.37 The statute
therefore violated the first amendment." Although Alabama's stat-
ute failed the constitutional test, the Court stated that "a statute
motivated in part by a religious purpose [might] satisfy the ...
criterion . . "3
BACKGROUND
Constitutional questions are customarily considered in their
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1535.
30. Id. quoting opinion of the district court.
31. Jaffree v. Wallace, 713 F.2d 614, 615 (11th Cir. 1983).
32. Wallace v. Jaffree, 104 S. Ct. 1704 (1984); Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct.
2479 (1985).
33. Id.
34. Wallace v. Jaffree, 104 S. Ct. 1704 (1984).
35. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 at 2490.
36. Id. at 2489-90.
37. Id. at 2493.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2490.
19851
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narrowest form.40 While the wide issue of religion in public schools
has been developed in many cases,4 1 the narrower issue of school
prayer has been addressed in only a few. The first of these cases
was Engel v. Vitale.42 In Engel, the New York State Board of Re-
gents composed a prayer which they recommended and published
as part of their "Statement of Moral and Spiritual Training in the
Schools. ' 43 The Board of Education, acting in its official capacity
under the law, directed a local school district to have the prayer
said aloud by each class in the presence of a teacher at the begin-
ning of each school day." The parents of some pupils filed suit,
challenging the constitutionality of both the state law and the
school district's regulation implementing it. They contended that
the official prayer was contrary to their religious beliefs and prac-
tices and that these actions of official government agencies violated
the establishment clause."5 The New York Court of Appeals upheld
the power of New York to use the Regent's prayer so long as the
schools did not compel any pupil to join in the prayer over his or
his parents' objection.46
On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the parents
contended that the prayer should be struck down as a violation of
the establishment clause because it was composed by government
officials as part of a governmental program to further religious be-
liefs. 47 The Supreme Court agreed, holding that it was not the bus-
iness of government to compose official prayer for any group of
American people.'8 By using the public school system to encourage
40. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 437 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
41. See, e.g., McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (use of
public school facilities for religious instruction under "released time" program);
Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (statute exempting from property
tax realty owned by religious associations); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968) (statute prohibiting the teaching of evolution); Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783 (1983)(practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 2376 (1984) (city's inclusion of
nativity scene in its Christmas display).
42. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
43. Id. at 423. "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee,
and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country."
Id. at 422.
44. Id. at 422.
45. Id. at 423.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 425.
48. Id.
[Vol. 8:125130
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recitation of prayer, a religious activity, the state had adopted a
practice wholly inconsistent with the establishment clause. 9 The
school district argued that the prayer did not officially establish
religious beliefs because it was non-denominational, and the pro-
gram did not require all pupils to recite the prayer, but permitted
those who wished to do so to remain silent or be excused from the
room.50 The Supreme Court held that neither the prayer's nature
nor its voluntary observance served to free it from the limitations
of the establishment clause.5 1 "When the power, prestige and fi-
nancial support of government is placed behind a particular reli-
gious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minori-
ties to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is
plain. '52 The Supreme Court found that the state had contravened
the establishment clause on three grounds: first, by composing an
official prayer; second, by using the public school system and its
facilities to encourage a religious activity; and third, by indirectly
coercing pupils into conformity.
The following year, in Abington School District v. Schempp,53
the Supreme Court was again called upon to consider the scope of
the establishment clause with respect to school prayer. Pennsylva-
nia legislators had enacted a statute requiring at least ten verses to
be read without comment from the Holy Bible at the opening of
each public school day." Any child could be excused from attend-
ing the reading upon his parents' written request.55 Abington Sen-
ior High School conducted its opening exercises pursuant to the
statute by broadcasting the reading into each room in the school
building. Following the reading, a recitation of the Lord's Prayer
was likewise broadcast, during which students were asked to stand
and join in repeating the prayer in unison.56 Participation in the
opening exercises was voluntary. The Schempp family filed suit
contending that their fourteenth amendment rights had been, and
would continue to be violated until the statute was declared to be
49. Id. at 424.
50. Id. at 430.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 431.
53. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
54. Id. at 205.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 206-07.
57. Id. at 207.
19851
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in contravention of the first amendment. 58 The district court found
the statute to be unconstitutional and entered an injunction re-
straining the school district from continuing to conduct the read-
ings and recitations. The school district appealed. 9
The United States Supreme Court considered this case in tan-
dem with another case which challenged the constitutionality of a
nearly identical statute passed by Maryland legislators.6 0 The Ma-
ryland Court-of Appeals, however, had held the Bible readings and
use of the Lord's Prayer to be constitutional,"
The Supreme Court reiterated the principles underlying the
establishment clause-the deeply embedded belief in liberty of re-
ligious opinion, the neutrality of government towards religion, and
the free exercise of a chosen form of religion. 2 The Court
concluded:
[tihe wholesome "neutrality" of which this Court's cases speak
* . . stems from a recognition of the teachings of history that
powerful sects or groups might bring about a fusion of govern-
mental and religious functions or a concert or dependency of one
upon the other to the end that official support of the State or
Federal Government would be placed behind the tenets of one or
of all orthodoxies. This the Establishment Clause prohibits. 63
The Court then stated that for a statute of the type under
consideration to withstand the strictures of the establishment
clause, it must have a secular legislative purpose and a primary
effect that neither advanced nor inhibited religion." Neither the
Pennsylvania nor the Maryland statute passed the test. The Court
found that the exercises in both states were of a religious character
and that Pennsylvania had intended them to be so." Furthermore,
the states were using the school systems implicitly to promote the
exercise of religion."' Both states contended that the statutes were
enacted with secular purposes, among which were promotion of
moral values, contradiction to the materialistic trends of the times,
58. Id. at 205.
59. Id. at 206.
60. Id. at 211.
61. Id. at 212.
62. Id. at 215-20.
63. Id. at 222.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 223.
66. Id.
[Vol. 8:125
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perpetuation of American institutions and teaching of literature.6 7
The Court stated that the place of the Bible as an instrument of
religion could not be gainsaid.6 8 The states' recognition of the per-
vading religious character of the opening exercises was consistent
with their permitting non-attendance at those exercises., 9 The
Court concluded that in both cases the laws passed by the states
required religious exercises in violation of the first amendment.
7 0
The major factual difference between Engel and Schempp was
that in Schempp the texts to be used in the school opening exer-
cises were not composed by the states. Even so, the states could
not escape the strictures of the establishment clause by using reli-
gious texts such as the Holy Bible and claiming a secular purpose
of literary study. The Court acknowledged that the Bible was wor-
thy of study for its literary and historical qualities. But to be con-
sistent with the establishment clause, the study would have to be
presented objectively as part of a secular program of education. 1
The statutes here promoted the opposite, religious effect. In addi-
tion, the other two grounds for unconsitutionality-use of the
school system to promote the readings, and indirect coer-
cion-were present.
The issue of prayer in public schools did not come before the
Supreme Court again for seventeen years. During the interval, in
the related public school case of Lemon v. Kurtzman,72 the Court
took the opportunity of assembling the cumulative criteria devel-
oped over many years for testing the constitutionality of statutes
under attack on establishment clause grounds. In Lemon, Rhode
Island's 1969 Salary Supplement Act provided a salary supplement
to be paid to teachers in parochial schools at which the average
per-pupil expenditure on secular education was below the average
in public schools. 73 Pennsylvania's Non-Public Elementary and
Secondary Education Act authorized the purchase of secular edu-
cational services such as salaries and textbooks for non-public
schools." Both Acts were attacked under the establishment
67. Id.
68. Id. at 224.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 224.
71. Id. at 225.
72. 403 U.S. 602, reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 876 (1971).
73. Id. at 608.
74. Id. at 609.
19851
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clause. 5 In examining the constitutionality of the Acts, the Su-
preme Court used three tests gleaned from its prior establishment
clause cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; second, its principal or primary effect must neither advance
nor inhibit religion; and third, it must not foster excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion. 76 The Court held both Acts un-
constitutional because the overall relationships arising under the
statutes constituted excessive entanglement between government
and religion." With one exception, the criteria laid out in Lemon
have been used in all succeeding establishment clause cases.
Kentucky's attempt to present the Ten Commandments as
part of a secular program of education failed in Stone v. Graham.
78
The statute required that printed copies of the Ten Command-
ments, purchased with private contributions, be posted on every
public school classroom wall.80 A notation appearing at the bottom
of each poster proclaimed that "[t]he secular application of the
Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its adoption as the funda-
mental legal code of Western Civilization and Common Law of the
United States.""' Parents of some public school students sought an
injunction against the statute's enforcement, contending that it vi-
olated the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first
amendment.82 The state trial court found the statute to be consti-
tutional because its avowed purpose was secular and not reli-
gious.83 A sharply divided Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed this
decision. 4
On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the State of
Kentucky contended that the statute served a secular legislative
purpose as evidenced by the notation.8' The Supreme Court dis-
75. Id. at 610.
76. Id. at 612-13.
77. Id. at 614.
78. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). Here the Court upheld the Ne-
braska Legislature's practice of opening each legislative day with a prayer by a
chaplain paid by the state. The Court did not apply the Lemon test, but looked
instead at the practice in the light of long historical acceptance of legislative and
other official prayers.
79. 449 U.S. 39 (1980), reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1104 (1981).
80. Id.
81. Id at 40 n.1.
82. Id. at 40.
83. Id.
84. Stone v. Graham, 599 S.W.2d 157 (Ky. 1980).
85. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980).
[Vol. 8:125
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agreed. The Court found the Ten Commandments to be a sacred
text, so that the pre-eminent purpose for posting them on school-
room walls was plainly religious in nature." The legislative recita-
tion of a supposed secular purpose could not save the statute from
the strictures of the establishment clause, because the only effect
of the posted copies would be to induce schoolchildren "to read,
meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and obey, the [Ten] Com-
mandments."8 Although the Bible verses were not read aloud, as
in Engel and Schempp, even a relatively minor encroachment on
the first amendment could not be tolerated." The decision in
Stone v. Graham demonstrated that even though the verses were
not composed by government officials, and no coercion of school-
children existed, any attempt to introduce religious texts into pub-
lic schools other than in the curriculum as literature, would fail.
The religious purpose behind such an attempt could not be cos-
metically disguised.
Finally, in Karen B. v. Treen,89 a statute authorizing a period
of silent meditation came under scrutiny. At issue was a Louisiana
statute's enabling legislation, pursuant to which a local school
board had established guidelines providing that each school day
begin with a minute of prayer followed by a minute of silent medi-
tation. 0 The guidelines required each teacher to ask if any student
wished to volunteer a prayer, and if none did so, the teacher could
offer a prayer of his own. If the teacher elected not to pray, then
the period of silent meditation began immediately. 91 Students who
wished to participate in the prayer portion of the exercises were
required to submit their parents' express written permission and to
make a verbal request to join in the exercise.2 Non-participating
students could remain outside the classroom.' 3 The parents of
some of the students sought declaratory and injunctive relief, con-
tending that the statute and regulations offended the establish-
ment clause.
The district court held that the enabling legislation and the
School Board's regulations did not offend the Constitution because
86. Id.
87. Id. at 42.
88. Id.
89. 653 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd mem., 455 U.S. 913 (1982).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
1985]
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they had a secular legislative purpose."4 The district court based its
conclusion on the testimony of the legislation's sponsors that the
purpose behind the statute was "to increase religious tolerance by
exposing school children to beliefs different from their own." 95 The
court denied relief and the parents appealed." The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals followed Stone and held that a testimonial
avowal of secular legislative purpose was not sufficient to avoid
conflict with the establishment clause.97 The observance of prayer,
a primary religious activity, has a more obvious religious purpose
than the mere display of a religious text.98 Once again, the provi-
sions for excusing students who did not wish to participate in the
prayer sessions betrayed the legislature's recognition of the funda-
mentally religious character of the exercise.' 9 The State of Louisi-
ana contended that the statute was constitutional since it was con-
tent-neutral. 100 This argument failed under Engel and Schempp
because the statute gave rise to the same grounds for infir-
mity-use of the public school system to favor a particular reli-
gious practice and its corollary of indirect coercion. 10 1 The court of
appeals reversed. 1 2 The United States Supreme Court affirmed in
a memorandum opinion. 0 3
The net result of Engel, Schempp, Stone and Treen was a
blanket ban on any vocal Bible reading or prayer, voluntary or in-
voluntary, in the public schools. In response to the ban and in an
effort to appease the establishment clause, many states enacted
legislation providing for silent voluntary prayer as an alternative
to meditation during a period of silence at the beginning of the
public school day.'" When the constitutionality of these "moment
of silence" statutes came into question, the federal courts of appeal
were unable to reach consistent decisions.' 0 ' The United States Su-
94. Id. at 900.
95. Id.
96. 653 F.2d 897.
97. Id. at 900.
98. Id. at 901.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 902.
102. 653 F.2d 897.
103. Treen v. Karen B., 455 U.S. 913.
104. See supra note 6.
105. Compare Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337 (D.C. Mass. 1976)(up-
holding statute); May v. Cooperman, 572 F. Supp. 1561 (D.N.J. 1983)(striking
down statute); Beck v. McElrath, 548 F. Supp. 1161 (M.D. Tenn. 1982)(same);
[Vol. 8:125
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preme Court directly addressed the issue in Wallace v. Jafree.
ANALYSIS
In Wallace v. Jaffree the Supreme Court held that Alabama's
"meditation or voluntary prayer" statute violated the establish-
ment clause because it had no secular purpose. Further, the record
revealed that the state's actual purpose was to endorse religion.'"
The Court began by characterizing as "remarkable" the district
court's conclusion that the federal Constitution imposed no obsta-
cle to Alabama's establishment of a state religion. 107 The Court re-
iterated the firmly embedded proposition that the several states
have no greater power to restrain the individual freedoms pro-
tected by the first amendment than does the Congress.' 8 One of
the first amendment's underlying principles is that an individual
has a right to refrain from accepting the creed established by the
majority."' When this principle is examined in the "crucible of lit-
igation," the unambiguous conclusion must be that the individual
freedom of conscience protected by the first amendment "em-
braces the right to select any religious faith or none at all."1 0 Con-
comitantly, no government may prescribe what shall be orthodox
in religion. Alabama was required to respect this basic truth no less
than the United States Congress.1
The Court then laid out the three criteria used in testing a
statute under establishment clause attack. These criteria, known
collectively as the Lemon test, 12 are: 1) the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; 2) its principal or primary effect may
neither advance nor inhibit religion; and 3) the statute may not
foster excessive government entanglement with religion.1 13 Since
Alabama's statute could not meet the requirements of Lemon's
first criterion, consideration of the second and third criteria was
obviated. 4 Both the sponsor's testimony and the legislative his-
tory conclusively demonstrated that the only purpose behind en-
Duffy v. Las Cruces Public Schools, 557 F. Supp. 1013 (D.N.M. 1983)(same).
106. 105 S. Ct. at 2490.
107. Id. at 2486.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2488.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2489.
112. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
113. Id. at 612-13.
114. Jaf]ree, 105 S. Ct. at 2490.
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actment of the "meditation or voluntary prayer" statute was to re-
turn prayer to Alabama's public schools.1 5 This evidence alone
would have been sufficient to render the statute unconstitutional.
In addition, however, the textual relationship between this statute
and its companion measures revealed its wholly religious charac-
ter.116 The significant textual difference between the original
"meditation" statute and this one was the addition of the words
"or voluntary prayer." Since the "meditation" statute already pro-
tected every student's right to engage in voluntary prayer in an
appropriate moment of silence during the school day, the addi-
tional words in the "meditation or voluntary prayer" statute could
be nothing less than an. endorsement and promotion of prayer as a
favored practice.11 7
Chief Justice Burger dissented. He stated that the Court's
holding manifested not neutrality, but rather hostility towards reli-
gion, because the Alabama legislature had no more endorsed reli-
gion than the Congress did when it provided for legislative chap-
lains, or than the Court did when it opened each session with an
invocation to God.' In addition, he pointed out that the sponsor's
statements of purpose upon which the Court relied were made af-
ter the legislature had passed the statute, so that the Court's deci-
sion to strike down the statute for lack of secular purpose was
based solely on the personal subjective motives of a single legisla-
tor.119 Justice White took the view that the first amendment does
not proscribe a statute that provides, when initially passed, for a
moment of silence for meditation or prayer. He could not invali-
date a statute that at the outset provided the legislative answer to
the question "May I pray?'1 2 0 Justice Rehnquist's lengthy dissent
explored the historical precedent of the establishment clause.12
The clause "has been expressly freighted with Jefferson's mislead-
ing metaphor [of the wall of separation between church and state]
115. Id. at 2492.
116. Id. at 2491.
117. Id. at 2492.
118. Id. at 2505-06.
119. The Chief Justice summed up the Court's deliberations as follows: "The
mountains have labored and brought forth a mouse." Id. at 2508, quoting HoRAcE,
EpisTLEs, bk. IH (Ars Poetica), In. 139.
120. Id. at 2508. "[I]f a student asked whether he could pray during [a mo-
ment of silence], it is difficult to believe that the teacher could not answer in the
affirmative."
121. Id. at 2508-20.
[Vol. 8:125
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for nearly forty years."' 22 Constitutional doctrine, according to the
Justice, has therefore been built upon a mistaken understanding of
constitutional history. 123 Justice Rehnquist concluded that nothing
in the first amendment prohibits a generalized endorsement of
prayer, such as Alabama's statute was. 124
Alabama's "meditation or voluntary prayer" statute failed the
Lemon test because it was clearly religious in purpose and textual
content. This is not to say, however, that all statutes offering a
choice between meditation and voluntary silent prayer during a pe-
riod of silence will fail the Lemon test. Although the purpose crite-
rion appears to be the most difficult hurdle to clear, the Court sug-
gested in dicta that even though "a statute [may be] motivated in
part by a religious purpose, [it] may yet satisfy [that] criterion. "125
What, then, are the parameters set by the Supreme Court for
"moment of silence" statutes? First, the statute must meet the
three Lemon criteria, the first and most demanding of which, in
this context, is the "purpose" test. The statute's enactment must
have a clear secular purpose, that is, a purpose which is not overtly
or specifically religious. 12  Secular purposes might include use of
the moment of silence as a transitional tool, to calm the students
and serve as a bridge between the tumult of the playground and
the serious business of a day of study. 2' The statute might create
the opportunity for a moment of appropriate solemnity. It might
serve to strengthen discipline in the classroom.12 8 Under these cir-
cumstances, any religious purpose would only be secondary and
therefore constitutionally permissible. The key is the overall use of
the time as a secular tool, particularly since students are constitu-
tionally permitted to use the moment of silence for prayer if they
122. Id. at 2509.
123. Id.
124. "It would come as much of a shock to those who drafted the Bill of
Rights as it will to a large number of thoughtful Americans today to learn that
the Constitution, as construed by the majority, prohibits the Alabama Legislature
from 'endorsing' prayer." Id. at 2520.
125. Id. at 2490.
126. WEasTER's NiNTH NEW COLLEGIATE DIcTIoNARY 1061 (1983).
127. Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional
Standard, 47 MINN. L. REV. 329, 371 (1963)(quoting Editorial, Washington Post,
June 28, 1962, § A, at 22, col. 2).
128. Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass. 1976). The court con-
cluded that the legislature "could reasonably believe that students tend to learn
greater self-discipline and respect for the authority of the teacher from a required
moment of silence." Id. at 342.
1985] 139
15
Spalding: Constitutional Law - Moment of Silence Statutes May Threaten the
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1985
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
so wish. Any plausible pedagogical purpose should be sufficient to
meet the first Lemon criterion. Lemon's second and third crite-
ria-the statute may neither advance nor inhibit religion,1 29 nor re-
sult in excessive governmental entanglement-appear easier to
meet. A moment of silence statute which suggests prayer as an al-
ternative to meditation is "wholly consistent with the clearly per-
missible purpose of clarifying that silent, voluntary prayer is not
forbidden in the public school building."' 30 Such a statute is un-
likely to foster an excessive government entanglement with religion
since close administrative supervision, spot checks, or large sums
of taxpayers' money are unnecessary for its successful
functioning.'
The second parameter within which the statute must remain is
the textual requirement. A moment of silence statute must offer
prayer as an alternative to meditation in a textually neutral man-
ner. Alabama's statute failed because it was an obvious textual
progression towards official endorsement of prayer as a favored
practice."3 2 However, an original statute which includes voluntary
prayer as an alternative to meditation should be constitutionally
sound. "A moment of silence law that is clearly drafted and imple-
mented so as to permit prayer, meditation, and reflection within
the prescribed period, without endorsing one alternative over the
others, should pass this test."' 3' The crucial factor is the lack of
official endorsement of any one suggestion over another. If all such
suggestions are neutrally presented as equal alternatives, the stat-
ute will meet the textual requirement.
Wallace v. Jaifree demonstrates a slight lessening of the Su-
preme Court's rigidity towards prayer in public schools. From
dicta in the opinion, the states may conclude that, provided they
can produce a plausible secular purpose for enactment of a mo-
ment of silence statute, whether it be in the mind of the sponsor,
in the legislative record, or in the statute itself, they can take full
advantage of any secondary religous effect the statute might have.
Jaffree itself and other sources show that the Engel and Schempp
decisions caused confusion in the states as to whether prayer in
public schools was permitted at all.'" Jaffree clears up the confu-
129. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
130. Jafree, 105 S. Ct. at 2507 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis original).
131. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620-21.
132. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2492.
133. Id. at 2501 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
134. Telephone interview with Representative N.J. Crawford, House Sponsor
140 [Vol. 8:125
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sion. The Court stated that public school students have always had
the right to pray in an appropriate moment of silence if they so
wish.13 5 Now this right may be officially endorsed. Only when the
government endorses the right as an officially favored alternative
to meditation or reflection is the establishment clause violated.36
The United States Supreme Court decided Jaffree on June 4,
1985.137 On July 5, 1985, the North Carolina Legislature enacted a
moment of silence statutei in response to school boards' requests
for guidance "in this grey area." 3 9 Analyzed in terms of Jaffree,
the statute is constitutionally ironclad. In pertinent part the stat-
ute provides:
[A] period of silence not to exceed one minute in duration shall
be observed and . . .during that period silence shall be main-
tained and no one may engage in any other activities. Such period
of silence shall be totally and completely unstructured and free of
guidance or influence of any kind from any source.140
First, although the statute mandates a period of silence, it offers
no suggestions for any mental activities during that time, and
of North Carolina's "moment of silence" statute (July 24, 1985). Rep. Crawford
stated that the school boards were uncertain as to what to do in "this grey area."
See Note, Daily Moments of Silence in Public Schools: A Constitutional Analy-
sis, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 364 (1983); Sky, The Establishment Clause, The Congress,
and The Schools: A Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REv. 1395 (1966). See also
Press & McDaniel, Justice, NEWSWEEK, July 15, 1985 at 69-70.
135. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2491.
136. Id. at 2493.
137. Id. at 2479.
138. 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 637.
139. Telephone interview with Rep. N.J. Crawford, supra note 134.
140. 1985 N.C. Sess Laws 637.
An Act to Permit Local School Boards to Authorize The Observance
of a Moment of Silence Each Day in School.
(28) To authorize the observance of a moment of silence. Local
boards of education may adopt policies to authorize the observance of a
moment of silence at the commencement of the first class of each day in
all grades in the public schools. Such a policy shall provide that the
teacher in charge of the room in which each class is held may announce
that a period of silence not to exceed one minute in duration shall be
observed and that during that period silence shall be maintained and no
one may engage in any other activities. Such period of silence shall be
totally and completely unstructured and free of guidance or influence of
any kind from any sources.
This act is effective upon ratification and applies to all school years
beginning with the 1985-86 school year.
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therefore avoids the possibility of constitutional infirmity under
Jaffree's textual requirement. Further, local school boards may
adopt the policy at their option.," Finally, the legislative purpose
behind the enactment is clearly secular. The House sponsor stated
that the moment of silence was to be used as a "helpful transi-
tional interlude, much like an athlete taking a deep breath before a
race.""'  Courts should only find an improper purpose behind a
moment of silence statute where either its text or its official legisla-
tive history suggest that its primary purpose is to endorse
prayer."13
North Carolina's statute "was crafted to meet the guidelines of
the United States Supreme Court."'' 4 The statute successfully
meets those guidelines, and it is further buttressed by the fact that
no official legislative history of its passage exists"15 into which judi-
cial inquiry could be made. Certainly, the argument exists that "no
power on earth-including th[e Supreme] Court and Con-
gress-can stop any teacher from opening the school day with a
moment of silence for pupils to meditate, to plan their day-or to
pray if they voluntarily elect to do so. '"146 North Carolina's statute
does nothing more than provide for such a moment of silence.
The question remains-what if the Legislature were to pass
another statute that offered a choice between "meditation or silent
141. Id. In at least one school district, the policy appears to be working well.
"'I was wary at first,' Clinton B. Johnson, the principal, said of Wilson County's
new policy requiring all public school classes to observe a moment of silence at
the beginning of the day. The school board adopted the policy in September. 'I
thought we'd have kids who didn't handle it well, and teachers never liked un-
structured time. But I was wrong. It gives the kids a moment to calm down and
discipline themselves. They can pray if they want to, but I'd say most of them
don't.'" Raleigh News and Observer, October 20, 1985 at 1A, col. 1-2.
142. Telephone interview with Rep. N.J. Crawford, supra note 134. Senate
Sponsor, Senator Henson Barnes, stated that he informed Senate members, on
the floor, that the purpose of the statute was to "set parameters or guidelines for
the local Education Associations with regard to the moment of silence." The aim
was to create uniformity throughout the State for the local boards. Telephone
interview with Senator Barnes (Oct. 17, 1985).
143. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2500 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
144. Raleigh News and Observer, July 5, 1985 at 1A, col. 6.
145. Personal interview with Mrs. Vivian Halperin, Chief Librarian, N.C.
Legislative Library, Raleigh (July 19, 1985); telephone interview with Representa-
tive Wright, House Second Judiciary Committee, N.C. Legislature (July 22, 1985).
146. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2505 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). "It is difficult to
discern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thoughtful
schoolchildren." Id. at 2499 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgement).
142 [Vol. 8:125
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voluntary prayer"? 4 7 Such a statute would be an original statute
in terms of text in that neither "meditation" nor "prayer" appear
in the present statute. Its legitimate secular purpose might simply
be to endorse officially every student's right to pray, as permitted
under Jaffree. Would it pass constitutional muster? Probably not.
The present statute implicitly protects the right to pray, and tex-
tual neutrality alone is not sufficient to achieve constitutionality
under Jaifree. Because North Carolina already has a moment of
silence statute, another statute offering "meditation or voluntary
prayer" would be open to attack on the grounds that its avowed
secular purpose was a sham. As Stone and Treen demonstrate, the
courts are prepared to look behind an avowed secular purpose
where necessary. The North Carolina Legislature has effectively
stymied any future efforts to insert "prayer" into a moment of si-
lence statute.
CONCLUSION
In Wallace v. Jaffree,1 8 Alabama's statute mandating a mo-
ment of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer" was declared
unconstitutional. The statute failed the Lemon test because its en-
actment had no clear secular legislative purpose and its text re-
vealed an impermissible endorsement of religion.1 49 The Supreme
Court indicated in dicta that other similarly worded statutes might
be constitutional provided they were enacted with a secular legisla-
tive purpose.1 50
The possibility of litigation remains because although an
avowed secular purpose may be present, it might be a sham. The
courts would then have to "distinguish the sham purpose from the
sincere one. 1 51 For proponents of the idea that every vestige of
religion, direct or indirect, should be eradicated from the public
schools, the door is still open to attack moment of silence statutes
on establishment clause grounds.
The wall separating church and state remains high but not
147. According to the Library of Congress, no states have done so since Jaf-
free was decided. Telephone interview (October 17, 1985).
148. 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
149. Id. at 2490-91
150. Id. at 2490.
151. Id. at 2500 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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completely impregnable. The Supreme Court's decision in Wallace
v. Jaffree offers a small grappling hook for the determined climber.
Valerie B. Spalding
20
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss1/5
